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Executive Summary 
 
Schools with high levels of pupil turnover tend to have low average levels of pupil attainment. 
This observation has led many to infer that changes of school are bad for those pupils who 
move, and that a high level of pupil mobility is bad for other pupils and bad for schools. On 
this basis, understanding and tackling the consequences of pupil mobility has become a key 
policy issue. However, it is arguable to what extent poor performance is a consequence of 
pupil movement, because pupils who are the most likely to move tend also to be educationally 
disadvantaged in other ways. 
 
Our study looks carefully at whether pupil mobility in primary school really disrupts learning. 
We focus on the effect that pupils entering school during Years 3-6 in Key Stage 2 in England 
have on incumbent pupils in their school year group who joined the school in Key Stage 1 and 
remain there until the end of the primary phase. This issue is important for school policy 
because of the economic case for intervention when the school choice and timing decisions of 
some pupils have an impact on the educational outcome of others. 
 
The research is based on information on the test scores of the population of age-11 (Year 6) 
pupils in primary schools in England from 2002-2005, coupled with pupil census information, 
retrospective age-7 test results, and details of pupils’ school attendance history. To take 
account of unobservable differences between schools, we look at differences in mobility 
experienced within schools from one year to the next, that is, we estimate the expected 
disadvantage a pupil faces from being educated in a cohort that experiences high mobility, 
relative to similar pupils in preceding or subsequent cohorts in the same school. 
 
 
Our main findings are that: 
• Pupil mobility is disruptive and immobile pupils in mobile cohorts progress less 
well between ages 8 and 11. However, observed levels of mobility can account for 
very little of the variation in pupil performance: a pupil in a cohort experiencing a 
very high 10 percent annual turnover rate can only expect to be 1-2 weeks behind a 
pupil whose school cohort is completely stable throughout the age-8 to age-11 
period 
• Pupils moving the shortest distances between schools are the least disruptive, 
though there is no difference in moves within Local Authority areas and those 
between them, and poor pupils are no more disruptive than non-poor. We do not 
consider the specific effect of recent immigrants in this study. 
• Differences by month of entry are much more pronounced. In line with what we 
would expect, pupils arriving in September are far less disruptive than those 
arriving at other times.  
• There are few notable differences in response to mobility for different demographic 
groups, different school sizes, or urban versus rural school settings.  
• Mobility later in the Key Stage phase is increasingly disruptive to a pupil’s own 
progress. Each year’s delay in moving during Key Stage 2 reduces progress over 
this 4-year phase by an average of 0.085 value-added points, or about 1 week. 
 
On balance, our evidence indicates that although mobility does disrupt educational progress 
slightly, it is not a major cause of low achievement. Even so, policy to provide additional 
resources to schools with high mobility rates may well be justified on grounds of inter-school 
equity, because mobility provides a good indicator of pupils who are ‘at risk’ for low 
achievement and because it is a way of compensating schools for more general background 
disadvantages. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
We consider whether a child’s education is affected by turnover and disruption in the 
composition of their school cohort. This issue is important for policy because it means that 
schools that experience high levels of pupil mobility because of local demographic 
characteristics may be disadvantaged relative to others with more stable populations. It is also 
important in the context of policy related to school choice, because more frequent switching 
between schools during the process of search may actually impede pupil progress. 
 
Using administrative data on four cohorts of pupils in English primary schools, we construct 
measures of pupil mobility based on the date of pupil entry into school between ages 3 and 
11. We estimate the effect of this mobility on pupil achievement, focussing mainly on its 
external effect on incumbent, immobile pupils. Our methods acknowledge that pupil mobility 
is likely to be determined by school quality and pupil characteristics. This link occurs because 
popular schools develop queues that increase the number of pupils arriving late, and because 
incoming and incumbent pupils may differ in ability. Our identification strategies exploit 
cohort-to-cohort variation within schools and information on pupils who change school 
because of school closures and amalgamations. 
 
We show that pupils progress more slowly between ages 7 and 11 in schools where annual 
rates of pupil entry are high. That is, pupils do better academically if their school-mates have 
a long history in the school than if many of their school-mates joined the group late, which we 
attribute to the disruptive effect of new arrivals. However, like previous work for the US 
(Hanushek at al 2004), we find that the scale of these effects are fairly modest once we 
account for unobservable differences in school quality and pupil sorting: An age-11 pupil in a 
school with a stable and unchanging population could expect to be about one to two weeks 
ahead of a similar pupil in an extremely disrupted school experiencing 10% inflow annually 
amongst children aged 7-11. However, a one standard deviation in the rate of turnover is only 
2.4%, so differences in turnover cannot account for much of the variance in pupil 
achievement observed in our data. 
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Although the focus of the paper is the impact of peer mobility, we also investigate the 
association between pupil moves and their own performance. In the absence of any 
compulsory random reassignment of pupils, and without implausible structural assumptions, it 
is very hard to disentangle the detrimental impact of a change of school from the positive 
benefits of a better pupil school match or from changes in unobservable pupil attributes. 
Nevertheless, our results on the timing of moves – and in particular the timing of moves 
resulting from school closures – suggest that later moves are more disruptive than earlier 
moves during the school phase. These results suggest that the net effect of a change of school 
in any year between ages 8 and 11 is to lower academic progress over these years by around 
3.5% of a standard deviation relative to entry one-year earlier. This difference is quite small, 
but is not non-existent, as claimed in previous research for London by Strand and Demie 
(2006). 
 
The structure of our paper is as follows. In the next section we outline previous works that are 
related to ours and summarise their findings. In Section 0 we explain the modelling 
framework that we will apply to the English primary school system and administrative data 
described in Section 0. The results of our empirical estimation are in Section 0, and Section 0 
provides a brief summary and conclusions. 
 
 
2 Literature and Context  
 
 
In recent years, the observation that schools with high levels of pupil turnover tend to have 
low average levels of attainment has led many to infer that pupil mobility has an adverse 
influence on educational outcomes. Certainly education practitioners think mobility has an 
effect on school performance: in the survey of 43 schools by Demie et al (2005), 86% of 
headteachers reported that they though it mattered. With these concerns in mind, the 
Government has argued that mobility “is a challenge to which we must rise if we are to have 
an impact on individual pupils, on the schools they belong to, and on their future contribution 
to society as a whole” (Charles Clarke, then Secretary of State for Education and Skills, in 
Department for Education and Skills 2003). 
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The main British education policy debates in this field have concentrated on the effects of 
mobility on academic achievement and child development more generally, and on whether 
schools with high levels of mobility should be resource-compensated in some way (ALC 
2005). Another concern is that pupil mobility, if correlated with academic achievement, has 
important implications for the evaluation of school performance. Accordingly, since 2000, 
pupil mobility has been absorbed into school inspection process (Office for Standards in 
Education, 2000 and 2002) and an indicator of “social mobility” is included in the school 
league tables published on the Department of Education and Skills web site. Especially 
relevant for our research are concerns raised throughout the literature that the integration of 
new pupils can create a diversion of teaching resources away from current pupils that may 
lead to negative externality arising from mobility.  
 
Even so, the question of whether mobility really has a ‘causal’ impact on pupil attainment – or 
whether it is just that lower attaining pupils are more mobile or bad schools have high 
turnover – remains unclear. In fact, good empirical analysis of mobility in the English 
educational system and internationally is quite rare. Although, the issue has attracted 
researchers for a long time (e.g. Douglas 1964), it is only very recently that the patterns of 
pupil mobility in England at a national level have been analysed (Machin, Telhaj and Wilson 
2006). Most other empirical research that exists for England relies on descriptive statistics 
(often compiled by schools or LEAs) on small samples in specific circumstances (e.g. Alston 
2000, Demie 2002, DfES 2003, Dobson and Pooley 2004  and Greater London Authority 
2005).  
 
Most of the research literature on pupil mobility has been concentrated on two main themes; 
the extent of pupil mobility and its determinants; and pupil mobility and pupil attainment. 
Machin, Telhaj and Wilson (2006) in their comprehensive empirical study offer an analysis of 
the extent of and patterns in pupil mobility for all state school children in England. Using 
administrative data for 2 academic years of the English pupil census, their main findings are 
that pupils from lower income families, and those with lower previous academic achievement, 
are significantly more likely to move. However, their analysis suggests that mobile children 
are more likely to end up in ‘better’ performing schools than the ones they left, a finding that 
is consistent with a story (amongst others) in which pupils and there parents engage in a 
process of ‘Tiebout’-type search choice (Tiebout 1952). Dobson, Henthorne and Lynas 
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(2000), examining the nature and causes of pupil mobility in 6 LEAs, find that migration and 
family break-ups are the main factors associated with causes of pupil mobility. Ofsted (2002), 
analysing mobility in 3300 primary schools and 1000 secondary schools that were under 
inspection regime between 2000 and 2001, reports huge difference between schools in the 
extent of pupil mobility, and that schools with high mobility levels tend to be those enrolling 
pupils of lower-income families.  
 
Some studies have gone further to try to answer the important question of whether pupil 
mobility really matters for pupils’ achievement. This question is a difficult one to answer 
since disentangling the direction of causation between pupil mobility and achievement is a 
huge challenge. This problem becomes even more difficult knowing that pupils move schools 
for different reasons. Some move for reasons linked to school choice where parents try to 
send their children to better schools; others move for reasons other then their schooling – 
parents divorce, get new jobs, or migrate. Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004) is the only study 
to attempt to separate out these linkages. They argue that moves made for Tiebout-choice 
reasons impact positively pupil achievement while other moves are likely to impact 
negatively to achievement due to disruption, and try to separate out these influences on the 
basis that Tiebout moves introduce long run gains whilst disruption induces only short run 
costs. In the Texas elementary school setting that they study, mobility rates seem 
extraordinarily high – 23% of pupils switch schools each year according to their figures – but 
pupil moves incur, on average, a cost of about 1% of one standard deviation in terms of the 
pupil’s annual gain in maths achievement. Hanushek et al also look at externality induced by 
mobile pupils that is the main issue to which we turn to in our empirical work. 
 
The results of other studies focusing on the link between attainment and pupil mobility have 
been more mixed, usually reporting either a negative correlation with academic achievement 
or no association at all. Strand (2002) argues that much of the work that has looked at the 
correlation between mobility and attainment without taking into account other factors is 
highly misleading. Indeed, when Strand (2002) and Strand and Demie (2005) control for 
background and school factors in their regressions, the negative mobility-attainment 
relationship is driven away. However, these two studies are based on a single London Local 
Education Authority, have no explicit strategy for dealing with the simultaneity of school 
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performance and pupil’s school choice decisions and make no attempt to take into account the 
possible positive gains to some pupils induced by ‘Tiebout’ type choice. 
 
The empirical work we present below addresses the question of whether pupil mobility affects 
performance, in the English school context. It is an advance on previous work for England (or 
anywhere else in the UK) in that we use large scale administrative data on the population of 
pupils throughout the country and because we look for credible ways to measure the 
disruptive externality induced by mobile pupils and to test this for robustness to alternative 
explanations. We do not have quite the level of detail on repeated pupil test and timing of 
moves found in Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004) for Texas, which allows these authors to 
look at the impact of own-mobility on the acceleration in attainments However, we do have 
useful information on pupil home postcodes and on school closures, both of which we can 
bring to bear on the analysis for the purpose of eliminating unobserved characteristics of 
pupils and their background. Moreover, we look at the effects of cohort specific entry rates, 
conditional on entry rates in other cohorts in the same school, a strategy that is effective in 
controlling for time-varying school characteristics. In the next section we set out our 
modelling approach. 
 
 
3 Empirical Modelling and Identification Strategy  
 
 
Our goal is to assess to what extent a child’s progress in primary school is affected by 
changes in their school and classroom caused by entry of new pupils into their peer group. 
Policy analysis and previous research has usually started from the presumption that entry of 
pupils is disruptive, and is likely to impede progress at school, although it is also possible that 
changes in group make up are stimulating to pupils and encourage educational. We will use 
empirical evidence on mobility and academic progress in the English schools to provide 
answers to these questions. ‘Progress’ here will be assessed in terms of the gain in pupil 
achievement measured by standard tests at age 7 and at age 11. In the English school system, 
these ages correspond to school Year 2 and Year 6 respectively, which are at the ends of 
school phases referred to as Key Stage 1 (Years 1-2) and Key Stage 2 (Years 3-6). 
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The model that underlies our estimates is one in which achievement (k) in a given Key Stage 
( { }1,2g∈ ) is influenced by disruption in the years prior to the tests, both because of a pupil’s 
own mobility into and between schools, and because of the disruption induced by turnover of 
his or her peers in school. In terms of pupil’s own mobility, we will focus on the date ( gistd ) 
when each pupil ( ) joined school (i s ) during or before the Key Stage (g) leading up their 
test. When measuring peer-group turnover, we look at the proportion of the school roll that 
joins during or before the Key Stage ( gistm
ia
). In addition, we allow that achievement depends 
on partially observable pupil-specific ( ) and school-specific ( sr  ) factors that influence the 
level of achievement, pupil-specific ( ) and school-specific (ib sq  ) factors that affect the rate 
at which a pupil progresses with age, and an interaction term which captures the educational 
value of the pupil-school match ( ). The basic empirical model is, adding the usual error 
term and allowing for multiple cohorts (t): 
ic ps
 
( )
1
h g
gist gh hist gh hist i i i s s s gist
h
k d m a b g c p q g rα β ε
=
=
= + + + + + +∑ +  (1) 
 
The potential unobservable components in this model present obvious problems when it 
comes to estimation using standard regression techniques: Mobile pupils may have different 
levels of unobserved ability or educational advantage/disadvantage than stable pupils; Schools 
that are otherwise disadvantaged by resource limitations, intake composition and other 
geographical factors may also experience higher rates of mobility because of local population 
demographics; The decision of pupils to enter (or exit schools) and hence their entry dates 
into school is likely to be influenced by potentially unobservable components of school 
quality. Elimination of all these factors presents a serious challenge to estimation. Below we 
describe the way we approach this challenge, given the data that we can bring to bear on it. 
 
Firstly, differencing the model between two Key Stages, 2 and 1, in which we have test 
results observed for the same pupil, gives rise to a ‘value-added’ model of educational 
achievement. For pupils who switch schools, this transformation really does not help much as 
inspection of (1) will reveal: The ‘value-added’ transformation only eliminates fixed pupil or 
family background characteristics that determine the level of attainment (relative to other 
pupils) throughout all Key Stages. For these movers, the within-school transformation will not 
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successfully eliminate any of the unobservable school related components. On the contrary, 
the gain in attainment between school phases is a combination of the personal disruption 
induced by their move, the improvement (or deterioration) in the match with their school, the 
difference in the expected performance between their destination and origin school (in terms 
of both levels and trends) and differences in the phase-specific shocks. Without explicit 
randomisation of pupils in and out of schools at different times, or ad-hoc parametric 
assumptions and restrictions, identification of the parameters of interest for school movers 
between the two phases is something of a lost cause1. 
 
Better progress can be made if we look at the case of pupils who do not change school 
between phases. For this group, the value-added transformation successfully eliminates a 
number of these influences. For these stayers over Key Stage 1 and 2, the gain in achievement 
between these two school phases is now just combination of own entry date (which is by 
definition in or before Key Stage 1), peer-mobility-related factors in both phases, pupil ( ) 
and school (
ib
sq ) characteristics that influence how fast a child progresses with age, plus an 
error term. Furthermore, if we have multiple cohorts observed in different years (t), it is 
possible to eliminate the remaining school fixed effect sq  by the standard within-groups 
transformation based on deviation of the variables from school-means, and this provides a 
starting point for our regression-based estimates: 
 
  ( ) ( )2 1 21 11 1 22 2 21 11 1 2 1ist ist ist ist ist i ist istk k d m m bα α β β β ε− = − + + − + + −% % % % % %% % ε
                                                
 (2) 
 
 
1 Hanushek et al 2006 try to get round this problem by firstly eliminating the unobserved individual 
components by allowing for individual fixed effects in the differenced model so that they identify mobility 
effects off the acceleration in attainment. Secondly, they impose some ad-hoc structure and assume that the 
remaining interaction between school quality and individual unobservables (the Tiebout choice component) can 
be estimated from long-run gains from a move, whilst the disruptive effects influence current year test scores 
only. We are unable to implement the pupil fixed effect strategy in the differenced model because we only have 
tests scores at two dates. Nor would we wish to impose the assumption about the persistence of these effects, 
even if we had the data available. 
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Hence, we focus almost entirely on (2), and in particular the influence of peer-group mobility 
in Key Stage 2 expressed by parameter 22β . Even then there are obvious problems. Firstly, 
mobility rates in a pupil’s cohort in this phase may be induced by changes in school quality 
(trends, or shocks) that are present in 2ist 1istε ε−% % . This link would occur if, for example, a 
deterioration in school quality caused a decrease in rate of entry or an increase in the rate of 
exit. Our proposed strategy for dealing with this is based on the recognition that mobility rates 
throughout the school – not just in the pupil’s own cohort – will change in response to shocks 
or trends in school quality. This observation provides a basis for a falsification test, since we 
would expect a pupil’s academic progress to be relatively unresponsive to changes in mobility 
in the school outside there own cohort and we can test this by including other cohorts’ school-
specific mobility rates in our regressions (this approach is similar to that used by Lavy et al 
(2004)). 
 
A second issue is that unobserved pupil attributes (b) that affect progress may be related to the 
pupil’s (or parents’) choice of entry date in Phase 1. There are, however, no obvious reasons 
to expect the within school changes in mobility rates from cohort to cohort to be related to 
fixed pupil characteristics. For this reason, the issue may not be of major concern in our main 
goal of estimating 22β  except in so far as including pupil’s own entry date in our regression 
models leads to biases because of its potential endogeneity. We will demonstrate, using a 
balancing-type test, that the within-school changes in mobility are in fact largely uncorrelated 
with pupil characteristics that are included in and excluded from our main regression 
estimates. We will also test the sensitivity of our estimates of 22β  to the inclusion and 
exclusion of date of entry and other control variables. 
 
Another way forward is to try to find pupil reassignments between schools, the timing of 
which are unrelated to either pupil or destination school characteristics. This prospect is quite 
challenging. One potential source of such variation is local school closures or mergers. Such a 
policy-related occurrence certainly generates a change of school, the timing of which is 
exogenous to pupil and destination school characteristics. Whether or not the assignment of 
pupils from closed schools to destination schools is unrelated to pupil and school 
characteristics is more questionable. For instance, parents and pupils may still be offered a 
choice of school when their original school shuts down. Such a choice is, plausibly, less 
optimal than the family’s original choice of school, but the choice of destination school is 
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nevertheless likely to be correlated with pupil characteristics. Moreover, if assignment to 
schools depends on the destination school having excess capacity, then receiving schools are 
likely to be those schools that are less popular, and perhaps of lower quality. Importantly, if 
we focus on the model for ‘stayers’ only (Equation 2) and we allow for school fixed effects, 
then the proportion of children arriving from closed schools is quite likely to be uncorrelated 
with incumbent pupils’ characteristics, because the school fixed effects control for expected 
differences in destination school quality and composition. A further drawback, however, is 
that schools that are closed are potentially different – probably lower quality – than those that 
remain open and so the pupils moving from those schools may have educational advantages 
or disadvantages that may make a distinct impact on the receiving schools. Still we consider 
this issue worth investigating, and will exploit school closures and pupil reassignments as one 
weapon in our armoury. 
 
 
4 The English School System and Administrative Data  
 
 
National curriculum and assessment 
 
Compulsory education in England is organised into five stages referred to as Key Stages. In 
the Primary phase, pupils enter school at age 3-5 in the Foundation Stage and then move on to 
Key Stage 1, spanning ages 5-6 and 6-7. At age 7-8 pupils move to Key Stage 2, sometimes – 
but not usually – with a change of school. In few cases there are separate Infants and Junior 
schools (covering Key Stage 1 and 2 respectively) and a few areas still operate a Middle 
School system (bridging the Primary and Secondary phases). At the end of Key Stage 2, when 
they are 10-11, children leave the Primary phase and go on to Secondary school where they 
progress through Key Stage 3 and 4. At the end of each Key Stage, pupils are assessed on the 
basis of standard national tests and progress through the phases is measured in terms of Key 
Stage Levels, ranging between W (working towards Level 1) and Level 5+ in the Primary 
phase. A point system can also be applied to convert these levels into scores that are intended 
to represent about one term’s (10-12 weeks) progress. 
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The focus in our empirical work is on mobility between Key Stages (or phases) 1 and 2. For 
the main analysis, we consider only those schools which take pupils prior to Key Stage 2, and 
educate them through to their end-of-phase tests at age 10-11. 
 
 
School types and governance  
 
These primary schools in the state-sector in England fall into a number of different categories, 
and differ in terms of the way they are governed, the ownership of the school buildings, and 
who controls pupil admissions. All state schools are funded largely by central government, 
through Local Authorities that are responsible for schools in their geographical domain. 
Community Schools are the most common type of school (68% of pupils), and are quite 
closely controlled by the Local Authority. Foundation (2%) and Voluntary Aided  (23%) 
schools have more autonomy, particularly with regard to pupil admissions and are owned or 
have links with charitable organisations, usually religious. Some schools (15%) are classed as 
Voluntary Controlled and are similar to Community schools in terms of admissions and 
governance, but have a religious ethos (almost all Church of England). In addition, there is a 
small private, fee-paying sector2. In this paper we restrict attention largely to Community 
schools, which form a relatively homogenous group in terms of institutional arrangements. 
Moreover, pupil movements between Community schools seem, a priori, less likely to be 
driven by pupils searching or queuing for admission to the more distinctive types of school. 
Community schools also have less scope for picking and choosing the pupils they admit, so 
are unlikely to influence the composition of their pupil intake at any stage. 
 
 
The data  
 
The UK’s Department for Education and Skills (DfES) collects various data on school and 
pupils centrally, because the pupil assessment system is used to publish school performance 
tables and because information on pupil numbers and characteristics are necessary for 
administrative purposes – in particular to determine funding. A National Pupil Database 
                                                 
2 Private schools educate around 6-7% of pupils in England as a whole. 
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(NPD) holds information on each pupil’s assessment record in the Key Stage tests throughout 
their school career. Since 2002, the DfES has also collected information on pupil’s school, 
gender, age, ethnicity, language skills any special educational needs or disabilities, 
entitlement to free school meals and various other pieces of information via the Pupil Level 
Annual Schools Census (PLASC), which is incorporated into the test-score information in the 
NPD. The pupil census has information on postcode of residence: a postcode is typically 10 
contiguous housing units, which allows us to control very carefully for residential location. 
 
Importantly for our project, the PLASC data records the date when the pupil entered the 
school they are in at the time of the census (January in each year). By looking back over the 
various census years and cross-checking with information on which school a pupil was at 
when they sat their Key Stage 1 tests in Year 2, and which school a pupil is at for their Key 
Stage 2 tests in Year 6. From this, we can  build up a reasonably accurate picture of patterns 
of pupil entry over Years 3 to Years 6. However, our analysis only considers the population of 
pupils who are recorded in English schools in Year 2 and Year 6 in the database, so we 
explicitly exclude from our analysis any consideration of the impact of new immigrants to 
England from the rest of the UK or from overseas, or pupils moving to the state sector from 
the private sector. In our view this is a strength, as integration of refugees and immigrants 
who do not speak English presents special challenges in schools, and the impact of these 
groups should be given separate consideration. We leave this for future research. Although 
exit dates are not recorded, we can deduce exits from schools during Years 3-6 on the basis 
that a pupil’s school identifier for their Key Stage 1 tests (Year 2) is different from the school 
identifier for their Key Stage 2 tests (Year 6). 
 
What we can glean about mobility prior to the Key Stage 1 tests in Year 2 is more incomplete 
because in each census we only have information on a pupil’s last entry date. If they have 
moved during Years 3-6, we do not know their initial entry date without looking back to 
earlier census data. This correction is obviously impossible for pupils who are aged 10/11 in 
the first year (since there is no earlier census to go back to), though becomes increasing 
accurate as we move forward to the 2005 census. This issue provides another compelling 
reason, alongside the analytical reasons discussed in Section 0, for focussing on the sample of 
pupils who we know entered school before or during Key Stage 1 and made no subsequent 
moves. There is still the potential for error in calculating the proportion of a pupil’s cohort 
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who joined during Key Stage 1, because this is derived from this incomplete information on 
pupil entry. We have assessed the extent to which these errors are important by comparing our 
main results with what we get when we focus on those pupils in more recent cohorts for 
whom we have more reliable data, and comparing our main results with those obtained using 
the latest recorded entry date. As it turns out, these errors in coding the data are not important. 
 
The National Pupil Database thus provides a large and detailed administrative dataset on 
pupils and their test histories. The test histories contain details on the Levels reached in the 
core subject areas – Maths, English, Science (Science is only tested beyond Key Stage 1) – 
and, for Key Stage 2 and beyond, the raw scores in the component tests. We use information 
on four cohorts: those aged 10-11 and sitting their Key Stage 2 tests in 2002-2005, who took 
their Key Stage 1 tests in 1998-2001 respectively. Other data sources can be merged in at 
school level and to pupil home postcode. 
 
In total, this large and complex combined data set gives us information on a population of 
around 2 million pupils in over 14000 Primary schools in England. We use sub-groups of this 
population to estimate the effect of peer-group mobility during Key Stage 2 (between ages 7 
and 11) using the modelling framework outlined in Section 0. 
 
 
5 Results 
 
 
The characteristics of immobile and mobile pupils  
 
Our main sample is taken from the population of age 10-11 primary school pupils in England 
between 2002 and 2005. We only consider Community schools that accommodate pupils over 
the entire primary phase (age 4/5 or before, to age 10/11) and drop any schools that closed or 
opened during our study period. We look at Community schools only so as to reduce the 
amount of institutional heterogeneity. As discussed above, we mainly focus on the effect of 
cohort mobility on the sub-population of ‘immobile’ pupils who entered Community primary 
schools prior to Year 3 (age 8/9). In total, this gives us around 686000 pupils once we have 
imposed the various sample restrictions and dropped observations with missing data. The key 
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variables of interest in this sub-group are described in Table 1 panel (a). In panel (b) for 
comparison purposes, we summarise the same variables for pupils who move school during 
the primary phase and are recorded joining their Year 6-school at sometime from Year 3 to 
Year 6. 
 
A first point to note is that academic achievement at Year 6 in Key Stage 2 (age 10/11) is 
substantially and significantly lower in the mobile group joining from Year 3 to Year 6, than 
the immobile group. The difference is about 0.89 points or 0.24 standard deviations of the 
pupil distribution. It is also immediately clear, however, that this is unlikely to be a causal 
link, because mean achievement of mobile pupils at Key Stage 1 is similarly lower suggesting 
that these pupils were different even before changing school – though of course mobility may 
be correlated across phases. The difference at Key Stage 1 is about 0.73 points or 0.21 
standard deviations of the pupil distribution. On average, as we would expect given the 
scaling of the point system, progress over the four years between Year 3 and Year 6 amounts 
to around 12 points on average (4 years of 3 terms) across pupils and core subjects. This will 
be the key dependent variable in our regression analysis. As could be deduced from the levels, 
this mean gain this is lower for the mobile group, by 0.16 value added points3.  
 
Row 4 shows the explanatory variable on which we focus attention – entry rates during Years 
3-6 over the Key Stage 2 phase. This is the mean (unweighted) proportion of each school’s 
Year 6 group that last joined the school during Years 3-6. Based on this, the rate of pupil 
entry during Years 3-6 experienced by immobile pupils is close to 4% annually with a 
standard deviation of 2.4%. We show the distribution in more detail in Figure 1a, from which 
it is clear that a large majority of schools have non-zero entry rates over this period. 
Relatively few pupils experience entry rates over 10% amongst their peers, and the 95th 
percentile is about 8.5%. A substantial proportion of the variation in entry rates is within-
school (Figure 1b), where the standard deviation is 1.5%. 
 
Turning back to Table 1, we can see that the annual exit rate during this period is, as we 
would expect, very similar to the entry rate. The similar calculation for entry during Years 1 
                                                 
3 These figures are based on average level of achievement across Maths, Reading and Writing at Key 
Stage 1 and across Maths, English and Science at Key Stage 2 
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and 2 shows a higher average rate of entry of 6.2%. Looking down at the sub-sample of pupils 
mobile during Years 3-6, we see that these pupils are overly represented in schools with high 
Year 3-6 mobility rates, because the mean entry rate they experience is 6.6% - well above the 
4% experienced by the immobile pupil group in panel (a). 
 
Looking at pupil entry dates, the majority (63.7%) of pupils in the stable sub-population 
entered school in Reception year (age 4/5) which corresponds to the start of compulsory 
education in England. The next biggest group (18.7%) start one year before this, in Nursery 
with a small proportion recorded in nurseries at an earlier age. The proportion of pupils 
entering during Year 1 and Year 2 during the Key Stage 1 phase is just under 7% in each year. 
Amongst the sub-set of pupils mobile during Key Stage 2, the proportion joining in each 
school year falls from 33.5% in Year 3 to 13% in Year 6 just before the tests. 
 
Below this we present a few key pupil background characteristics. The most striking thing is 
that the proportion on free meals in the immobile group is much lower than in the group that 
is mobile during Key Stage 2. This fact, that mobile pupils come from more disadvantaged 
backgrounds has already been documented elsewhere (Machin, Telhaj and Wilson 2006, 
Strand 2006, DfES 2003). Mobile pupils are less likely to be White British, but also less 
likely to have English as a second language. 
 
In summary, it is clear that mobile pupils are different from immobile pupils along many 
observable dimensions, and so we presume, along many unobservable dimensions too. They 
have lower achievements at age 10/11 but also lower initial level of achievement and differ in 
terms of income and ethnicity. Given this, and as explained in Section 0, measuring the 
impact of a pupil’s own mobility on their own achievement is difficult, because these 
differences are also likely to exist along unobservable lines. Although this is an issue we will 
return to later, we focus now on the effect that the mobility of these pupils from Years 3 to 6 
has on the stable population of pupils who joined a school prior to Year 3 and stay there until 
Year 6. To do this, we use the modelling framework of Section 0. 
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Do incoming pupils cause disruption?  
 
Our core regression results on the links between the levels of cohort mobility and pupil 
achievement are shown in Table 2. We present only the key coefficients and standard errors. 
Control variables are listed in the table notes, and include indicators (dummy variables) for 
ethnic group, free-meal entitlement, month of birth, language, gender and year. We also 
control for school cohort size in Year 6. For our main results in this table and others we focus 
on pupil entry rates as an indicator of school mobility, because this seems to be most relevant 
when considering the disruptive impact on incumbent pupils. Exit rates may also be a factor 
to consider and we turn to this later in Section 0, but we cannot calculate exit rates prior to 
Year 3-6 from our data. 
 
Turning now to the regression results, Column 1 of Table 2 presents the simple association 
between the share of the age-11 school cohort that joined the school from Year 3 to Year 6 
and the Year 6 achievement (Key Stage 2 points) of pupils who have been in the school since 
Year 2 or earlier. Clearly, there is quite a strong link: the coefficient implies that a 10% 
increase in the share entering in an average year between Years 3 and Year 6 is associated 
with a 0.76 lower point score, equivalent to three-quarters of a term. Controlling for pupil 
characteristics and own date of entry (prior to Year 3) in Column 2 does not reduce this 
association by much. Moreover, mobility during Years 1 and 2 (captured by the share entering 
in these years in Row 2) has only a relatively small and statistically insignificant impact on 
levels of achievement in Year 6. Columns 3 and 4 switch the analysis to modelling the gain in 
points between Key Stage 1 (Year 2) and Key Stage 2 (Year 6) tests. The dramatic reduction 
in the coefficient relative to Column 1 and 2 suggests that these first results are indeed not 
causal in interpretation. The association of Year 3-6 entry rates with pupil progress over these 
years is much reduced, implying that much of the apparent ‘impact’ of Year 3-6 mobility on 
incumbent pupils was already embodied in the Key Stage 1 tests in Year 2. Adding in controls 
for pupil characteristics and own entry date prior to Year 3 makes almost no difference in 
Column 3: a 10% increase in pupil entry rates is linked to a 0.2 point decrease in value-added 
(2-3 weeks progress) during the Key Stage 2 phase. Just as we saw in the case of Year 6 test 
levels, pupil mobility in Years 1 and 2 (Row 2) does not seem important for progress between 
Years 3 and 6. Indeed, a near-zero coefficient is exactly what we would expect in a properly 
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specified value added model, given the coefficient on Year 1-2 entry rates as shown in 
Equation 2. 
 
So far we have no controls for school or for geographical location. In Column 5 we take 
account of both these factors by estimating the within-school model of Equation (2). The 
disruptive impact of cohort mobility is now measured from changes in the entry rates within 
school from cohort to cohort, and so takes account of any persistent factors attributable to the 
school or its geographical surroundings. Doing this exercise halves the coefficient. Adding in 
pupil level controls and entry dates in Column 6 changes things slightly, but still the general 
impression is that an increase in pupil entry rates of 10% per year reduces the attainment of 
incumbent pupils by about 0.1 value-added point (or 0.1 term) over this 4 year period. Is this 
amount large or small? From Table 1, this estimate implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in pupil entry rates decreases academic progress in incumbent pupils by just under 
0.01 standard deviations. Apparently then, pupil mobility is not a major contribution to the 
observed distribution of immobile pupil attainment, although pupils in schools with the few 
schools with highest rates of mobility could be markedly disadvantaged. 
 
Admittedly we have relatively limited controls for pupil background and family 
circumstances. To partly address this limitation, Columns (7) and (8) implements an even 
more stringent test and estimates within school-home-postcode groups. Estimation is now 
based on comparison of mobility rates experienced by pupils living in the same street and 
attending the same primary school, but in different age cohorts and hence sitting their Key 
Stage tests in different years. Controlling for background factors that are correlated with place 
of residence in this way reduces the sample size quite considerably, but changes the 
coefficient only slightly in relation to the standard error. In Column 7 without control 
variables the coefficient is no longer significant, but this improves when pupil characteristics 
are added in Column 8. We will take Table 2, Column (6) as our preferred specification. 
 
In the above discussion we have not drawn attention to the associations between pupil entry 
dates and pupil performance although these are presented in the table. Looking across the 
coefficients in these rows, it is clear that there is a strong association between pupil entry date 
and their personal academic achievement, though it is hard to pin down causality here. In 
Column 1, it seems that pupils entering outside of the main entry year (Reception) do less 
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well by Year 6. But this is true whether they enter before or after Reception year so there is no 
obvious systematic link between late entry and weaker performance. Turning to the columns 
using the value added specification, the pattern suggests that later entry prior to the Key Stage 
1 tests improves pupil progress after Key Stage 1. Looking back at the model of Equation (2) 
this could either be because late entry improves Key Stage 2 results, or more likely, that late 
entry has an adverse impact on Key Stage 1 results. Read in this way, the pattern of 
coefficients in Columns (4), (6) and (8) indicate that entry one year after Reception reduces 
achievement at Key Stage 1 by the equivalent of 0.2 terms and entry in the year of the tests 
reduces attainment by the equivalent of just over 0.3 terms. Entry in the years prior to 
Reception has smaller but significant benefits. 
 
These results in terms of pupil’s own entry should be treated with caution given that there will 
still be important unobserved differences between pupils even within school-home-postcode 
cells which may be correlated with entry dates. We note, however, that whether or not these 
entry dates can be treated as exogenous does not seem to have any bearing on our main 
findings on pupils’ cohort mobility; these are largely insensitive to the inclusion or otherwise 
of pupils’ own entry dates. 
 
 
Taking account of changing school quality and group characteristics  
 
The external effects of mobility that we have found so far are quite small, so we turn now to 
investigating whether our estimates are attenuated by preferences or other factors – especially 
Tiebout choice-type moves which we have failed to take into account. For a start, the school 
fixed effects approach in the above analysis will not successfully take account of the 
simultaneity induced by the fact that changes in entry rate over time may be  driven by 
changes in school quality over time that are unobservable to us but observable to incoming 
pupils (or their parents). A priori, we would expect this to attenuate our coefficients (upward 
bias them) since we would expect a positive association between desirable quality shocks and 
entry rates. But equally, there are reasons for doubting that this is too serious a problem 
because school choice decisions for incoming pupils are likely to be based on past or long run 
information about school quality, and not year-on-year changes in performance that are 
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reflected in cohort-specific test scores. In other words, period-specific shocks to school 
quality are hard to observe to outsiders who are considering a school move. 
 
However, we do not wish to rule this possibility out on theoretical grounds alone. Therefore, 
Table 3 presents results from a robustness test based on the idea that period specific shocks or 
trends in school quality generates changes in mobility in some or all cohorts within a school, 
not just the pupil’s own cohort. So, for each pupil i taking the Year 6 tests in year t in our data 
we can merge the Year 3-6 entry share of all the pupils in the Year 3-6 cohorts in the same 
school in year t. Adding this share in our regressions controls for shocks to school quality (a 
new head teacher for example) that affect all Year 3-Year 6 pupils in the school over the 
period that pupil i was in Years 3-6. It also controls for persistent school-Year-group specific 
effects (for example a bad teacher in a specific Year group – in English schools the same 
teacher will usually specialise in teaching one Year group). These results appear in Column 1 
of Table 3 that repeats the specification of Table 2 Column (6), but adding these new whole-
school entry rates as controls. In similar fashion, for each pupil taking the Year 6 tests in year 
t we can merge the Year 3-6 entry share of the Year 6 cohort in t+1, and/or of the Year 6 
cohort in t-1. Columns (2) – (4) of Table 3 add these new cross-cohort entry rates. As can be 
seen, in Columns (1) and (3), doing this hardly changes our estimate of the impact of Year 3-6 
entry rates and we still find a 10% increase linked to 0.1-0.15 value added reduction. In 
Column (3) the point estimate increases in magnitude quite sharply, suggesting a 0.2 point 
reduction in value-added for a 10% entry rate increase, although this change is in fact due to 
the different sub-sample imposed by including both the t-1 and t-1 entry rates together 
(because we lose one year in each case). Equally important, the coefficients on the entry rates 
of cohorts other than the pupils are insignificant and of positive sign. This indicates that 
although there may indeed be a weak positive link between school-wide quality shocks and 
entry rates into the school, this does not attenuate our coefficient of interest. 
 
The above method controls for unobserved period specific shocks and trends to school 
quality. We can look more directly at whether changes in entry rates form year to year may in 
some way be related to changes in the composition of the stable population of pupils within 
schools due to some unobservable sorting process. Although such cohort-specific sorting 
seems unlikely it is not without foundation. For example, a particularly high-ability school 
cohort may attract a higher inflow of pupils from outside which could lead to a positive 
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association between entry rates and academic progress of incumbent pupils. We investigate 
this issue in Table 4 where we test the correlation of entry rates with the mean characteristics 
of immobile school pupils using school level regressions with school fixed effects. We do the 
tests in two ways using a number of characteristics of incumbent pupils not included in our 
main models. These characteristics are the pupils’ mean test scores in Year 2 and some 
population census variables that describe the neighbourhood of pupils’ home addresses (based 
on their full postcode). The idea is to see if changes in cohort characteristics that are 
unobserved in our baseline models could be attracting (or repelling) incoming pupils. 
 
Firstly, in the top panel of Table 4 we regress each characteristic on the entry rate, conditional 
on the set of pupil characteristics and controls included in the main model4. Secondly, we 
regress the entry rate on the new set of incumbent characteristics, conditional on the pupil 
characteristics and controls included in the main model and carry out an F-test on the group. 
As can be seen from the individual standard errors and the F-tests, there is no indication that 
within-school changes in entrance rates are correlated with the within-school differences in 
cohort composition, even Year 2 mean test scores. It is also worth noting that the controls in 
these school level models – the ‘observable’ pupil characteristics such as free school meals, 
ethnicity, gender and language that we do include in our main regression – are also 
uncorrelated with entry rates; the F-test gives a p-value of 0.437. As a further test, we have 
tried including in our baseline regressions, controls for the group characteristics of the 
immobile group, the incoming mobile group or both (we used the proportion on free meals, 
the proportion White British and the proportion with English as a first language).The baseline 
results are largely unaffected by doing this..  
 
When we consider the impact of entrants, as in Table 2 Column 6, or even in Table 3, there is 
some danger that our estimate of the disruptive impact of incoming pupils is attenuated 
because parents organise the timing of their child’s change of school in such a way as to 
coincide with within-school teaching quality changes, resource changes or beneficial cohort 
composition changes in the destination school. One context in which this is an unlikely 
eventuality is when school switching is the result of school closure. There are over 1200 
closures recorded for England over the period we study, but most are not particularly valuable 
                                                 
4 A similar test is employed in Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2005) 
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to us because they involve amalgamations of school of different phases (e.g. Key Stage 1 and 
Key Stage 2 phases), name changes or other administrative adjustments that do not involve 
the re-integration of pupils from one group into another. However, around 7.6% of the pupils 
moving between schools in Years 3-6 appear to do so because the school they attended at 
Year 2 had genuinely shut down or merged with another school in such a way that its pupils 
were redistributed amongst other schools5. 
 
Pupil movements related to these closures provide us with a further check of robustness of our 
results to positive self selection of school movers into schools experiencing quality 
improvements: If this type of self-selection is a major issue, then we would expect to find a 
bigger negative association between within-school entry rates from closed schools and within-
school changes in pupils’ value-added scores in destination schools. What we find instead is 
that the point estimate obtained by replacing Year 3-6 entry rates in Table 2, Column 6 with 
entry rate of pupils from closed schools is in fact somewhat smaller in absolute value at minus 
0.476, although also very imprecisely measured because of the small amount of within school 
variation in entry rates (the standard error is 1.156). Clearly, this estimate is based on a 
                                                 
5 We contacted a number of Local Authorities about reasons for closure and policy on re-assignment of 
pupils. A common reason for closure was falling school roll, perhaps induced by demographic changes or rural 
depopulation. But unpopularity must rank as a highly likely cause of school decline which immediately leads to 
doubts that pupils coming from these schools will be in any way typical – especially if the falling role was due to 
poor educational standards. Moreover, pupils were typically reassigned to schools where there were vacancies 
and parents were often given a choice of school reallocation. It is in fact easy to show that pupils coming from 
closed schools are not representative and indeed have lower Key Stage 1 Year 2 test scores, are more likely to be 
on free meals and have other characteristics that are linked to lower educational achievement. They are also 
more likely to be reallocated to schools which have, on average, lower Key Stage 1 test scores and a higher 
percentage of pupils on free school meals. On this basis, reassignments from closed schools are not in their raw 
state at all helpful in providing a source of mobility that is exogenous to pupil or school characteristics. 
However, it is theoretically plausible, and can be shown using tests akin to those of , that within-school 
changes in entry rates from closed schools during are uncorrelated to within-school differences in Year-6-cohort 
characteristics.  
Table 4
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relatively small set of destination schools and on small numbers of pupil reallocations. 
Nevertheless, the point estimate gives us some confidence, at least, that our baseline estimates 
are not severely attenuated by positive self-selection amongst mobile pupils. 
 
 
Measurement issues and other robustness checks  
 
There are a number of questions regarding the measurement and specification of mobility and 
our sample restrictions, to which we now turn. The key coefficients from these robustness 
checks are presented in Table 5. 
 
The first row shows what happens when we control for exit rates in our baseline specification. 
So far, we have considered to what extent school-cohort specific entry rates have an effect on 
incumbent pupils in those cohorts. The theoretical assumption behind this is that incoming 
pupils disrupt teaching because they take time to assimilate and because teachers must devote 
additional time to these pupils in order to gauge their abilities and set appropriate class tasks. 
Social integration of new pupils provides, potentially, a distraction for existing pupils as they 
make friends (or enemies) in their new setting. However, other mobility-related factors – in 
particular the exit rate – could influence academic progress of the stable population of pupils, 
for instance if the loss of friends and classmates reduces a pupil’s self confidence and requires 
additional time to be spent reorganising social linkages. There is clearly a problem with 
including exit rates as a measure of mobility, because, given that it is the best pupils that stay 
(from Table 1) a high exit rate implies a better residual stock of pupils6.  Even so, when we 
include exit rates in our baseline specification, we do, as predicted, find a positive association 
between exit rates and pupil value-added, but the coefficient on entry rates shifts only slightly 
from our baseline estimate. This does not change our interpretation of the scale of the 
disruptive effects of entry. 
 
Another source of error is that entry rates are computed from our data on the basis of mobility 
in each school-specific cohort. A more accurate representation of the disruption experience by 
                                                 
6 Given this fact, neither exit rates nor the common index of turnover based on average exit and entry 
rates (and advocated by Dobson and Henthorne 2000) seem attractive for our purpose.  
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a particular pupil would be the entry rates into their own class in primary school, but we do 
not have this information in the data. There are typically two classes per school in an English 
primary school, but many have just a single form entry. One way to see if measuring entry at 
school-cohort level dilutes the apparent influence of mobility is to restrict attention to schools 
where we can be sure that there is only one-form intake. So Row 2 of Table 5 reduces the 
sample to schools with less than 30 Year 6 pupils recorded taking the tests, 30 being the 
maximum (but usually the target) class size in English schools7. From this specification we 
obtain an estimate that is less precise than our baseline estimates, but well within the previous 
range and is still significant at the 5% level. We infer from this test that mis-measuring 
mobility at the school rather than the classroom level is not misleading. 
 
There could also be concern that entry rates are correlated with class-sizes, either because 
pupils can only join a class when it is under-capacity or because more entrants add to class 
sizes. Class size might affect a pupil’s academic progress - although the evidence on this 
provides no consensus (Hanushek 2005, Krueger 2005). We do not have precise class size 
information and we already control for Year 6 cohort size in the regressions. However, in 
Row 3 of Table 5 we add an additional control for the number of classes in the school with 
more than 30 pupils, but this modification to the specification makes little difference. In Row 
4 we add the cohort size experienced by the pupil in Year 2. Now the coefficient is reduced in 
size and significance, though not way out of line from what we had before (given the standard 
errors). It should be noted that this result corresponds to a rather constrained specification, 
because variation in entry rates conditional on the initial and terminal stock must be perfectly 
correlated with exit rates, with all that entails given the discussion of exit rates above. 
 
Other checks we carry out in Table 5 are the following: estimate on the full sample of primary 
schools, not just Community schools; change from using the Year 2-6 gain as the dependent 
variable to using regressions with Year 6 tests as the dependent variable, and Year 2 tests on 
the right hand side; switch from a pupil value-added specification to one with Year 6 test 
levels as the dependent variable, but now with school fixed effects included. None of the 
results from these exercises are dramatically different, though the point estimate in the last 
                                                 
7 This limit is statutory before Year 3 in primary school and schools, and most schools try to adhere to 
this limit for  all age groups. 
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case is lower. Finally, we show another falsification test: in a specification with school fixed 
effects, Year 3-6 entry rates have a positive but insignificant association with a pupil’s prior 
Year 2 attainment. On the basis of all these checks, we have no reason to doubt that our main 
findings are unreliable. 
 
 
The geography and timing of moves, and heterogeneity in response 
 
Pupils move schools for different reasons, and we might expect the effects of incomers on 
immobile pupils to differ according to these reasons. Geographical range of moves may 
matter directly, or may depend on the motivation for switching schools which in turn may 
generate heterogeneity in responses. For instance, pupils who have moved schools over a long 
distance because of a family relocation may well find adjustment to their new school more 
difficult because of the other life adjustments they must make simultaneously. Conversely, 
pupils who have moved schools locally in search of a better educational match may take little 
time to readjust and impose lower costs, or even provide benefits, to incumbent pupils. 
Timing may also be important. We guess that pupils arriving at the beginning of the school 
year are more likely to have moved for school-choice reasons and that arrival at this time 
makes integration into school easier. Arrivals mid-term are presumably more likely to be 
motivated by unexpected life changes, and are probably harder to assimilate. The top panel of 
Table 6 looks for evidence on this heterogeneity, by splitting the entry rate into different 
groups according to geographical range – distance quantiles, or within/between Local 
Authority moves – and timing – either September entrants or other months. Further results in 
the bottom panel of Table 6 investigate heterogeneity in response according to characteristics 
of the incumbent pupils or the characteristics of the school. 
 
As it turns out, the differences by geographical range of move are not particularly exciting. 
The coefficients are quite similar in each case, although the standard errors and significance 
differ according to relative group size. There is some evidence that the shortest 25% moves 
are the least disruptive (the coefficient is smallest and the standard error largest here) which is 
in line with expectations, though there is no difference between the impact of long and 
medium distance moves, or between within and across LEA moves. Differences by month of 
entry are much more pronounced. Just over 44% of entrants arrive in September and the rest 
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are spread over the rest of the academic year. Scaling the coefficients into annual equivalents 
it is clear that the numbers in arrival in September is far less disruptive than arrival at other 
times. We look further to see whether poor pupils entering a school generate a bigger 
disadvantage than non-poor pupils, but there is no such evidence. Most of the impact is 
attributable to mobility of the much larger group of non-free meal pupils. 
 
Turning to differences across types of incumbent pupil, we note some differences although 
these differences are not dramatic. In particular, girls seem lightly more sensitive to peer 
group turnover than do boys. Poor children (on free school meals) are not, however, any more 
sensitive than non-poor. Some variation is also apparent when we look at heterogeneity across 
school types: Firstly, there is evidence of a nonlinearity in response, since schools with a high 
level of mobility seem less sensitive to changes in mobility than do schools with low and 
moderate mobility. However pupils in the largest schools show markedly more response to a 
given percentage point change in entry rates, indicating that the absolute number of mobile 
pupils may be a relevant factor. Pupils in schools in metropolitan areas are more sensitive to 
cohort mobility than others, but not significantly so. All-in-all however, the responses seem 
quite general and do not appear to be solely driven by specific types of pupil – either 
incumbent or mobile. 
 
 
Do mobile pupils show less academic progress?  
 
In the final part of our analysis we briefly turn to the performance of mobile pupils. This is the 
group whose characteristics are summarised in the lower panel of Table 1. So far we have 
looked at the impact of their mobility on other pupils. Now we consider briefly their own 
academic progress between ages 7/8 and 10/11. As we highlighted in Section 0, it is not easy 
to disentangle causal effects in this group, because the disruption associated with their school 
move is wrapped up with personal gains from a better individual-school match, a quality 
change associated with the school move, and unobserved pupil-specific attributes that lead to 
a higher move propensity. Even though we do no wish to make any claims about how 
mobility disadvantages this group relative to other pupils who stay put over this school phase, 
we argue that something can be inferred by looking at the links between move timing and 
pupil progress. Inspection of the coefficients in Table 7 in both Column 1 and Column 2 – 
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Column 2 is our preferred within-school specification – suggests that mobility later in the 
phase is increasingly disruptive to a pupil’s own progress. Moving in a given year in Key 
Stage 2 seems to reduce progress over this 4-year phase by an average of 0.085 value-added 
points, about 1 week or 3.5% of one-standard deviation. 
 
Of course even this small apparent disadvantage may just be an indication that pupils who 
move later are different in terms of unobservable ability-related characteristics. One way we 
can test this is to look again at pupils moving from schools that are closed or merged with 
other schools, which we do in Column 3 (OLS) and Column 4 (within-school). These 
specifications can be thought of as reduced-form estimates of a model in which entry from 
closed schools in a given year is used as an instrument for entry date, and estimate how entry 
from closed schools in a given year affect value-added relative to pupils entering from other 
schools at any time over these years. Although we know from our data that these pupils are 
not representative in terms of initial attainments or background characteristics, and tend to 
come from lower quality schools and go to lower quality schools, we have no reason to 
believe that those moving later in the school phase are any different from those moving 
earlier so the differences between the entry year coefficients within Column (3) or Column 
(4) seem to indicate some causal process at work. The pattern is similar to that in Column (1), 
and still suggests a progressive disadvantage from late entry, with a year’s delay to entry 
slowing down pupil progress by about 0.08 value-added points. This finding begs the question 
as to why later entry should slow down progress more than entry at another time. The most 
obvious explanation, and one that accords with general perception of how things are done in 
England’s schools, is that teaching during this school phase is not uniformly distributed over 
the school years. So, a pupil who loses learning time in adapting to a new school in Year 6 is 
much more disadvantaged than a pupil joining in Year 3 simply because a lot of the 
preparation for the Year 6 tests is condensed into the later stages of the Key Stage 2 phase. 
 
It is also worth noting that we find no relationship here between within-school group mobility 
and the individual attainments of the group members once we introduce school fixed effects 
(there is insufficient within school variation to measure this properly), but, without fixed 
effects, the estimates in Column (3) suggest that the disruptive impact of pupils from closed 
schools is of a similar order to our baseline estimates in Table 2. 
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6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
Policy makers and educational practitioners have in the last decade begun to acknowledge that 
high pupil mobility could contribute to poor school performance. It has been recognised 
before that pupils who change school more often do have lower achievements, but it is 
arguable to what extent this is due to mobility or simply due to the disadvantageous 
background characteristics and initial conditions that are correlated with ability (Strand 2002, 
Strand and Demie 2006). Moreover, the disruptive impact of a pupil’s mobility on their own 
attainment can be masked by the gains from changing schools: pupils often move in search of 
schools that match their educational needs more closely (Hanushek et al 2004). This is a 
debate on which we are unable to shed much new light given the data that we have available, 
though we show in contrast to Strand and in line with Hanushek et al that changes of school 
do slow down progress slightly during primary schooling, other things equal. Early moves are 
better than late moves, and each year’s delay in entry between ages 8 and 11 is associated 
with a set–back of one week, or 4% of one-standard deviation, in terms of test score ‘value-
added’ over these years. This is of similar magnitude, though difficult to compare with, the 
shock to annual pupil ‘value-added’ induced by a pupil move is reported in Hanushek et al 
(2006). 
 
Our paper focuses mainly on the external effects of mobile pupils on other pupils. We 
estimate the expected disadvantage to a pupil from being educated in a school age-cohort that 
experiences high mobility, relative to a similar pupil in a preceding or subsequent age-cohort 
in the same school who experiences lower mobility. This is a particularly pertinent issue for 
school policy because of the economic case for intervention when the school choice and 
timing decisions of some pupils have an impact on the educational outcomes of others. We do 
find that mobility is disruptive and immobile pupils in mobile cohorts progress less well 
between ages 8 and 11 on average. However, it should be emphasised that this is not a major 
driver of differences in educational progress between pupils: Observed levels of mobility (one 
standard deviation) can account for only 1% of one-standard deviation of the variation in 
pupil performance. Again, this result is very close to that reported for Texas by Hanushek et 
al. A pupil who experiences a 10% per year rate of new pupil entry per year between ages 8 
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and 11 (4 pupils per year on average) can only expect to be 1-2 weeks behind a pupil whose 
school cohort is completely stable throughout the period. 
 
One reason we find such low figures may be because schools already compensating for high 
levels of mobility. Certainly there are not yet any general administrative rules for allocating 
resources across schools on the basis of pupil mobility, and our estimates are based on within-
school changes so we doubt that this can be happening systematically. However, if schools 
reallocate resources internally from lower to higher mobility classes then we may be 
substantially underestimating the disruption caused by mobile pupils in the absence of such 
compensatory reallocations. We are, however, somewhat sceptical that this provides a 
credible explanation: if resources are being reallocated within schools, we would expect to 
find the costs of mobility in one cohort shared across younger and older cohorts in the same 
school, but we found no evidence of this happening. It should also be emphasised that our 
analysis excludes recent immigrants and asylum seekers – a substantial proportion of 
incoming pupils in some schools in London – because we consider only pupils with record in 
English schools. 
 
Mobile pupils certainly perform less well than immobile pupils, on average, but what emerges 
from our work then is a picture in which only a very small part of the performance gap 
between low-mobility and high-mobility schools could be put down to the externalities 
associated with pupil mobility and disruption. Our more tentative conclusions on the direct 
costs to a pupil of their own mobility also suggest that these costs are quite small too. Policy 
to provide additional resources to schools with high mobility rates may well be justified on 
grounds of equity, but the main basis for doing so would seem to be that mobility provides a 
good indicator of pupils ‘at risk’ for low achievement and because it is a way of compensating 
schools for more general background disadvantages. Mobile pupils do not appear to impose 
large external costs on other pupils, so there does not seem to be a clear economic rationale 
for policy to reduce mobility or to compensate incumbent and immobile pupils for the high 
class-room mobility they may experience. 
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 Figure 1: Density of annual entry rates experienced by immobile pupils in Years 3-6 in Key Stage 2, English primary schools 2002-2005 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the Estimation Sample 
 
 
Pupils last entering school before Year 3 
 Mean Standard deviation 
Key Stage 2 (Year 6) points 27.947 3.773 
Key Stage 1 (Year 2) points 15.254 3.400 
Value-added points Years 3 to 6 12.694 2.575 
Annual share entering during Years 3 to 6 0.040 0.024 
Annual share entering Years 1 to 2 0.062 0.058 
Entry Reception -2 0.039 0.194 
Entry Reception -1 0.187 0.390 
Entry Reception 0.637 0.481 
Entry Year 1 0.070 0.255 
Entry Year 2 0.067 0.250 
Pupil Numbers Year 6 42.400 17.896 
Free meals 0.168 0.374 
White British 0.821 0.383 
English first language 0.900 0.301 
Sample size 686041  
   
Pupils last entering school Year 3-6 
 Mean Standard deviation 
Key Stage 2 (Year 6) points 27.056 3.967 
Key Stage 1 points 14.526 3.605 
Value-added points Years 3 to 6 12.530 2.829 
Annual share entering during Years 3 to 6 0.066 0.047 
Annual share entering Years 1 to 2 0.064 0.059 
Entry Year 3 0.335 0.472 
Entry Year 4 0.272 0.445 
Entry Year 5 0.262 0.440 
Entry Year 6 0.131 0.337 
Pupil Numbers Year 6 41.935 20.100 
Free meals 0.260 0.438 
White British 0.805 0.396 
English first language 0.907 0.290 
Sample size 147264  
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Table 2: Entry to Primary School, and progress between Years 3 and 6, immobile pupils 
entering before Year 3 
 
 Year 2 
level, no 
controls 
Year 2 
level 
Year 3-6 
value-
added, no 
controls 
Year 3-6 
value-
added 
Within-
school, 
no 
controls 
Within-
school 
Within 
school- 
postcode, 
no 
controls 
Within 
school- 
postcode 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Annualised cohort 
share entering 
Years 3-6 
-7.617 
(0.587) 
-6.356 
(0.489) 
-1.938 
(0.394) 
-1.967
(0.384) 
-1.030 
(0.374) 
-1.203 
(0.375) 
-1.349 
(0.722) 
-1.553 
(0.723) 
Annualised cohort 
share entering 
Years 1-2 
- -0.248 
(0.218) 
- -0.289
(0.192) 
- -0.228 
(0.190) 
- -0.464 
(0.364) 
Entry Reception –2 - -0.335 
(0.047) 
- -0.270
(0.040) 
- -0.233 
(0.024) 
- -0.229 
(0.057) 
Entry Reception –1 - -0.305 
(0.030) 
- -0.104
(0.025) 
- -0.090 
(0.015) 
- -0.083 
(0.035) 
Entry Reception - Baseline - Baseline - Baseline - Baseline 
Entry Year 1 - -0.248 
(0.023) 
- 0.189
(0.018) 
- 0.174 
(0.014) 
- 0.193 
(0.035) 
Entry Year 2 - -0.341 
(0.024) 
- 0.303
(0.019) 
- 0.335 
(0.016) 
- 0.351 
(0.040) 
Pupil numbers in 
school Year 6 
- 0.004 
(0.001) 
- -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.004 
(0.001) 
- -0.003 
(0.002) 
Postcode fixed 
effects 
No No No No No No Yes Yes 
School fixed effects No No No No 6871 6871 407831 407756 
Pupils 687245 686041 686226 686041 685262 686041 685262 685077 
 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from regression of pupil test results on annualised school, cohort-specific entry rates. 
Standard errors clustered on school shown in parentheses. Underline significant at 1% level. Italic significant at 5%. In 
Columns (5) and (6) the effective sample size is 403,400 based on observations that have within postcode-school cell 
variation in cohort-specific entry rates. Estimation sample is pupils in Year 6 (age 10-11) in 2002-2005 in Community 
primary schools who joined their current school between Nursery and Year 2 (age 6-7). Schools included are those open prior 
to 1998 with combined Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 phases. Controls include pupil eligible for free meals, seven ethnic 
group dummies, English not first language, female, number of pupils in school-year, month of birth and month-of-entry 
within school year, academic year dummies. 
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Table 3: Entry to Primary school, and progress between ages 7 and 11, immobile 
pupils entering before Year 3; cross-cohort falsification tests 
 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Annualised cohort share 
entering Years 3-6 
-1.306
(0.424)
-1.003 
(0.481) 
-1.510 
(0.465) 
-2.199 
(0.793) 
Annualised cohort share 
entering Year 1-2 
-0.275
(0.214)
0.376 
(0.220 
0.285 
(0.247) 
0.310 
(0.390) 
Whole school entry rate 
Years 3-6 
0.451
(1.011)
-  -  -  
Whole school entry rate 
Year 1-2 
0.544
(1.248)
- - - 
Annualised cohort share 
entering Years 3-6 (t-1) 
- 0.250 
(0.449) 
- -0.328 
(0.725) 
Annualised cohort share 
entering Year 1-2 (t-1) 
- 0.099 
(0.233) 
- 0.095 
(0.378) 
Annualised cohort share 
entering Years 3-6 (t+1) 
- - 0.365 
(0.415) 
-0.181 
(0.646) 
Annualised cohort share 
entering Year 1-2 (t+1) 
- - -0.030 
(0.212) 
-0.361 
(0.336) 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Schools 6871 6674 6673 6498 
Pupils 686041 506553 506674 331609 
 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from regression of pupil test results on annualised school, cohort-specific and 
cross-cohort entry rates. Standard errors clustered on school shown in parentheses. Underline significant at 1% 
level. Italic significant at 5. Estimation sample is pupils in Year 6 (age 10-11) in 2002-2005 in Community 
primary schools who joined their current school between Nursery and Year 2 (age 6-7). Schools included are 
those open prior to 1998 with combined Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 phases. Controls include pupil eligible for 
free meals, seven ethnic group dummies, English not first language, female, number of pupils in school-year, 
month of birth and month-of-entry within school year, academic year dummies. 
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Table 4: Correlation of Year 3-6 entry rates with  various pupil characteristics 
 
Separate regressions of incumbents’ characteristics on annualised proportion entering Years 3-6, conditional on 
controls in Table 3 
Year 2 test score mean 0.075 (0.435) 
Home census output area proportion level 4 qualified -0.003 (0.010) 
Home census output area proportion living in socially rented homes 0.039 (0.024) 
Home census output area proportion in employment  -0.020 (0.012) 
Home census output area proportion non-qualified 0.022 (0.013) 
  
Regression of annualised proportion entering Years 3-6 on incumbents’ characteristics together 
Year 2 test score mean 0.000 (0.000) 
Home census output area proportion level 4 qualified 0.037 (0.027) 
Home census output area proportion living in socially rented homes 0.007 (0.010) 
Home census output area proportion in employment  -0.003 (0.019) 
Home census output area proportion non-qualified 0.035 (0.028) 
F-test on above 5 variables p= 0.317 
F-test on pupil characteristics used as controls p= 0.468 
 
Table 5: Additional robustness checks for impact of annualised Year 3-6 cohort entry 
rates on pupil mobility 
 
Controlling for Year 3-6 exit rates -1.490
(0.387) 
Schools with less than 30 pupils (one class entry) -1.000
(0.506) 
Controlling for number of classes with more than 30 pupils -1.188
(0.376) 
Controlling for Year 2 and Year 6 cohort size -0.811
(0.387) 
Including other primary school types – Voluntary Aided, Voluntary 
Controlled, Foundation 
-1.393
(0.273) 
Year 6 test levels as dependent variable, controlling for Year 2 test level, 
with school fixed effects 
-1.133
(0.354) 
Key Stage 2 levels as dependent variable, with school fixed effects -0.756
(0.366) 
Key Stage 1 levels as dependent variable, with school fixed effects 0.445
(0.330) 
 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from regression of pupil test results on annualised school, cohort-specific and 
cross-cohort entry rates. Standard errors clustered on school shown in parentheses. Underline significant at 1% 
level. Italic significant at 5% level. Estimation sample is pupils in Year 6 (age 10-11) in 2002-2005 who joined 
their current school between Nursery and Year 2 (age 6-7). Schools included are those open prior to 1998 with 
combined Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 phases. Controls include entry rates in Years 1-2, pupil eligible for free 
meals, seven ethnic group dummies, English not first language, female, number of pupils in school-year, month of 
birth and month-of-entry within school year, academic year dummies. 
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Table 6: Entry to Primary school, and progress between ages 7 and 11. 
Heterogeneity in mover type, and heterogeneity in response 
. 
 (1)  (2) 
Annualised share, bottom 25% 
distance  
-0.809
(1.130) 
Annualised share Years 3-6, 
September 
-0.117 
(0.054) 
Annualised share, middle 50% 
distance 
-1.328
(0.489) 
Annualised share Years 3-6, 
other 
-1.303 
(0.439) 
Annualised share, top 25% 
distance 
-1.364
(0.625) 
Equality F-test  p= 0.003 
Equality F-test p=0.003   
 (3)  (4) 
Annualised share, within LEA 
move 
-1.363
(0.470) 
Annualised share entering 
Years 3-6 not on free meals 
-1.577 
(0.418) 
Annualised share, between 
LEA move 
-1.125
(0.591) 
Annualised share entering on 
free meals  
-0.607 
(0.792) 
Equality F-test  p=0.748 Equality F-test  p=0.000 
 (5)  (6) 
Annualised share entering 
Years 3-6 
-0.917
(0.401) 
Annualised share entering 
Years 3-6 
-1.189 
(0.377) 
× Girls -0.229
(0.190) 
× FSM -0.080 
(0.438) 
 (7)  (8) 
Annualised share entering 
Years 3-6 
-2.117
(0.865) 
Annualised share entering 
Years 3-6 
-0.774 
(0.394) 
Annualised share entering 
Years 3-6 – squared 
8.555
(6.922) 
× Above median school cohort 
size 
-1.781 
(0.587) 
 (9)   
Annualised share entering 
Years 3-6 
-0.979
(0.456) 
- - 
× metropolitan school -0.579
(0.786) 
- - 
 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from regression of pupil test results on annualised school, 
cohort-specific entry rates. Standard errors clustered on school shown in parentheses. 
Underline significant at 1% level. Italic significant at 5. Estimation sample is pupils in Year 6 
(age 10-11) in 2002-2005 in Community primary schools who joined their current school 
between Nursery and Year 2 (age 6-7). Schools included are those open prior to 1998 with 
combined Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 phases. Controls include pupil eligible for free meals, 
seven ethnic group dummies, English not first language, female, number of pupils in school-
year, month of birth and month-of-entry within school year, academic year dummies. 
Total number of pupils making Year 3-6 moves = 147264. Of these, within LEA, 64.3%, in 
September 44.3%, poor 16.8% 
Metropolitan schools are those in Local Authorities in London, Greater Manchester, 
Merseyside, South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, West Midlands, West Yorkshire, representing 
84% of pupils. 
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Table 7: Entry to Primary School in Years 3-6, and progress between ages 7 and 11, 
pupils in Community schools with Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 phases entering in Years 
3-6 
 
 Age 7-11 value-
added 
Within-school From closed or 
merged schools 
Within-school, 
from closed or 
merged schools 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Annual share entering Years 3-6 -1.711 
(0.380)
-0.105 
(0.472) 
-0.766 
(0.384) 
0.185 
(0.378) 
Entry Year 3 baseline baseline -0.111 
(0.062) 
-0.099
(0.060) 
Entry Year 4 -0.043 
(0.021)
-0.052 
(0.020) 
-0.173 
(0.062) 
-0.211 
(0.061) 
Entry Year 5 -0.125 
(0.021)
-0.128 
(0.020) 
-0.365 
(0.063) 
-0.390 
(0.064) 
Entry Year 6 -0.252 
(0.027)
-0.231 
(0.026) 
-0.348 
(0.086) 
-0.447 
(0.080) 
School fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Pupils 147264 147264 147264 147264 
 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from regression of pupil test results on annualised school, cohort-specific entry 
rates. Standard errors clustered on school shown in parentheses. Underline significant at 1% level. Italic 
significant at 5%. Estimation sample is pupils in Year 6 (age 10-11) in 2002-2005 in Community primary 
schools who joined their current school between Nursery and Year 2 (age 6-7). Schools included are those open 
prior to 1998 with combined Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 phases. Controls include pupil eligible for free meals, 
seven ethnic group dummies, English not first language, female, number of pupils in school-year, month of birth 
and month-of-entry within school year, academic year dummies. 
 
